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TAXATION
Craig D. Bell *
INTRODUCTION
This Article reviews significant recent developments in the laws
affecting Virginia state and local taxation. Its Parts cover legislative activity, judicial decisions, and selected opinions and other
pronouncements from the Virginia Department of Taxation (“Tax
Department” or “Department of Taxation”) and the Attorney General of Virginia over the past year.
Part I of this Article addresses state taxes. Part II covers local
taxes, including real and tangible personal property taxes, license
taxes, and discrete local taxes.
The overall purpose of this Article is to provide Virginia tax and
general practitioners with a concise overview of the recent developments in Virginia taxation that are most likely to impact their
clients. However, it does not address many of the numerous minor,
locality-specific, or technical legislative changes to Title 58.1 of the
Virginia Code, which covers taxation.

* Partner, McGuireWoods L.L.P., Richmond, Virginia. LL.M., 1986, Marshall-Wythe
School of Law, College of William & Mary; J.D., 1983, State University of New York at Buffalo; M.B.A., 1980, Syracuse University; B.S., 1979, Syracuse University.
Mr. Bell is a past chair of the McGuireWoods Tax and Employee Benefits Department
and practices primarily in the areas of state and local taxation and civil and criminal tax
litigation. He is a Fellow of the American College of Tax Counsel, a Fellow of the Virginia
Law Foundation, a Fellow of the American Bar Foundation, a Master of the J. Edgar Murdock Inn of Court (United States Tax Court), an adjunct professor of tax law at the College
of William & Mary’s Marshall-Wythe School of Law, and a past chair of both the Tax and
Military Law sections of the Virginia State Bar and of the Tax Section of the Virginia Bar
Association. Mr. Bell is an emeritus director of the Community Tax Law Project, a nonprofit
pro bono provider of tax law services for the working poor, and is its recipient of the Lifetime
Pro Bono Achievement Award for his pro bono work in representing hundreds of Virginians
before the IRS, in United States Tax Court and in federal district court, as well as developing and training many lawyers in the area of federal tax law to expand pro bono tax representation for low-income taxpayers.
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I. TAXES ADMINISTERED BY THE TAX DEPARTMENT
A. Significant Legislative Activity
1. Judicial Appeals of State and Local Tax Cases
As a component of a significant expansion of the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals of Virginia, the General Assembly provides
that state and local tax cases that are litigated in Virginia Circuit
Court may be appealed, by right, to the Court of Appeals of Virginia.1 Under prior law, state and local tax cases litigated in Virginia Circuit Court can be appealed only to the Supreme Court of
Virginia, where certiorari is required to be granted before an appeal will be considered. The current petition for appeal process continues to apply to any case for which a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court is filed prior to January 1, 2022,2 and such appeal will
not be affected by the provisions of this legislation.3
2. Waiver of Accrual of Interest During Emergency Enacted
The Virginia Legislature enacted a new subsection C to the Virginia Code section 58.1-112 that authorizes the Tax Commissioner
to waive interest for any class of taxpayers when the Commissioner
finds that imposing interest has caused, or would cause, undue
hardship to such class of taxpayers because of a natural disaster
or other reason.4 The Tax Commissioner’s authority to waive interest is limited to situations in which the Governor declares a state
of emergency in the Commonwealth pursuant to subdivision (7) of
Virginia Code section 44-146.17 with respect to such natural disaster or other reasons.5 The legislation was enacted as emergency
legislation, making it effective on April 7, 2021.6

1. Act of Mar. 31, 2021, ch. 489, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 58.1-527, -1828, -2282, 58-3147, -3992 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
2. Id. at __.
3. Id. at __.
4. Act of Apr. 7, 2021, ch. 536, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at § 58.1112(C) (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
5. Id. at __.
6. Act of Apr. 7, 2021, ch. 536, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (“Be it enacted by the General
Assembly of Virginia . . . [t]hat an emergency exists and this act is in force from its passage.”).
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3. Income Taxation
a. Conformity to the Internal Revenue Code
Consistent with its long-standing practice, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 58.1-301, which mandates conformity with the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) as of a certain
date, and moved the date from December 31, 2019 to December 31,
2020.7 Although advancing the date of conformity, House Bill 1935
and Senate Bill 1146 left unchanged the previously adopted exceptions from the rule of conformity that are codified at section 58.1301(B)(1)–(5).8
The General Assembly specifically deconformed from the provisions of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
(“CARES”) Act and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021
(“CAA”).9 The legislation specifically decouples from the CARES
Act provisions temporarily changing the limitations applicable to
excess business losses, the next operating loss deduction, and the
business interest deduction.10 The legislation also decouples from
the CAA provision that permanently reduces the medical expense
deduction threshold from 10% of adjusted gross income (“AGI”) to
7.5% of AGI.11
What the amended conformity provisions do conform to is the
federal tax exemption for Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”)
loan forgiveness and Economic Injury Disaster Loan (“EIDL”) program funding, but they deconform from the provisions of the CAA
allowing deductions for business expenses funded by forgiven PPP
loan and EIDL funding proceeds.12 The effect of this decoupling
provision is to permit taxpayers to claim the federal exemption
from income for certain funding received under the EIDL program,
but it does not permit a federal deduction for business expenses
funded by the forgiven EIDL funding proceeds.
7. Acts of Mar. 15, 2021, chs. 117 & 118, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ & __, __ (codified as
amended at § 58.1-301 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
8. H.B. 1935 & S.B. 1146 Va. Gen. Assembly (Spec. Sess. I 2021) (enacted as chs. 117
& 118, 2021 Va. Acts at __); § 58.1-301(B)(1)–(5) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
9. § 58.1-301 (Cum. Supp. 2021); CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (Mar.
27, 2020); CAA, Pub. L. No. 116-260, 134 Stat. __ (Dec. 27, 2020).
10. § 58.1-301(B)(7)(9) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
11. Id. § 58.1-301(B)(6) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
12. See id. § 58.1-301(B)(10) (Cum. Supp. 2021); Paycheck Protection Program Flexibility Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-142, 134 Stat. 641; RISE After Disaster Act of 2015, Pub. L.
No. 114-88, 129 Stat. 686.
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Lastly, the new conformity legislation provides an individual
and corporate income tax subtraction for taxable year 2020 for “up
to $100,000 of all grant funds received by the taxpayer under the
Rebuild Virginia program.”13 The conformity legislation was
passed with an emergency clause that permits the legislation to
become effective on March 15, 2021, the date of enactment of the
law.14
b. Feasibility Study of Adopting Unitary Combined Reporting
The General Assembly passed House Joint Resolution Number
563 that directs the Division of Legislative Services, in conjunction
with the Department of Taxation, to establish a work group to assess the feasibility of transitioning to a unitary combined reporting
system for corporate income tax purposes.15 House Joint Resolution 563 noted that twenty-nine out of the forty-four states that
have a corporate income tax have adopted unitary combined reporting to treat multistate members and operations of a unitary
business enterprise as if they were a single company in the determination of the amount of corporate tax liability under that state’s
corporate income tax.16 Thirteen of these twenty-nine states
changed to unitary combined reporting in the last fifteen years.17
Virginia is one of the twenty states that treat each corporation as
a separate taxpayer in the determination of corporate tax liability.18 The resolution also stated that changing to a unitary combined tax filing will affect corporations differently.19
Given the wide variances that exist among different industries
when determining state corporate tax liability and filing options,
the Joint Resolution directs the working group to assess the following areas with respect to Virginia potentially adopting unitary
combined reporting:
1. administration feasibility;
2. impact on major classifications of corporations operating in
Virginia;
13. §§ 58.1-322.02 (30), -322.03(17), -402(H) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
14. Act of Mar. 15, 2021, ch. 118, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at § 58.1301 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
15. H.J. Res. 563, Va. Gen. Assembly (Spec. Sess. I 2021).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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3. impact on corporate expansion within and into Virginia; and
4. projected impact on Virginia’s tax revenue.20
The work group is directed to submit a summary of its findings,
recommendations, and a draft of any recommended legislation to
the Chairmen of the House Committee on Finance and the Senate
Committee on Finance and Appropriations no later than November
1, 2021.21
c. Study to Increase the Progressivity of Virginia’s Individual
Income Tax System
The Virginia Legislature also approved House Joint Resolution
567 that requires the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission (“JLARC”) to study increasing the progressivity of Virginia’s
individual income tax system.22 The resolution directs JLARC to
evaluate the fiscal impact of amendments to tax brackets, tax
rates, credits, deductions, and exemptions, as well as any other factors it deems relevant to making Virginia’s individual income tax
system more progressive and fair in response to economic dynamics.23 The resolution requires JLARC to recommend whether the
General Assembly should amend the Virginia Code or administrative regulations of the Department of Taxation and to make any
other appropriate recommendations by November 30, 2022.24
4. Tax Credits
a. Research and Development Credits Expanded to Bank
Franchise Tax
The General Assembly adopted legislation to permit taxpayers
subject to the bank franchise tax to claim the Research and Development Expenses Tax Credit and the Major Research and
20. Id.
21. Id. To support the study required by H.J. Resolution 563, Section 3-5.23 of the 2021
Appropriates Act, Acts of Apr. 7, 2021, ch. 552, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ requires corporations
that are members of a unitary business to file a corporate income tax report for the unitary
combined group containing the unitary combined net income of such group. The report is to
be based on Taxable Year 2019 computations and must include, at a minimum, the difference in tax owed as a result of filing a unitary combined report compared to the tax owed
under the corporation’s current filing results. Id. This “pro forma” return is required to be
submitted to the Tax Department on or before July 1, 2021. Id.
22. H.J. Res. 567, Va. Gen. Assembly (Spec. Sess. I. 2021).
23. Id.
24. Id.
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Development Expenses Tax Credit.25 Prior to the adoption of this
legislation, these two tax credits could be claimed only against the
individual and corporate income tax.26
b. Virginia Coal Tax Credits Sunsetted
The General Assembly enacted a January 1, 2022, sunset date
for the coal employment and production incentive tax credit and
the coalfield employment enhancement tax credit.27 This legislation repealed the Coalfield Employment Tax Credit, the Virginia
Coal Employment and Production Incentive Tax Credit that may
be claimed against the corporate income tax,28 and the Virginia
Coal Employment and Production Incentive Tax Credit that may
be claimed against the public service corporation’s license tax.29
Taxpayers that earned Virginia Coal Employment and Production Incentive Tax Credits that may be claimed against the corporate income tax prior to the repeal are permitted to claim such
credits pursuant to the applicable carryover period.30 This legislation limits the amount of such credits that a taxpayer may claim
per taxable year pursuant to the applicable carryover or carryforward periods, in the aggregate, to one million dollars.31 No taxpayer is permitted to amend a tax return for a taxable year prior
to January 1, 2022, to claim more of such credits than the taxpayer
claimed on their return before such amendment.32
c. Enhanced Credit for Agricultural Best Management Practices
The Legislature amended the Virginia Agricultural Best Management Practices Tax Credit to increase the amount that may be
claimed and to provide an enhanced Agricultural Best Management Practices Tax Credit for certain taxpayers with an approved

25. Acts of Mar. 11, 2021, chs. 47 & 48, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ & __, __ (codified as
amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-439.12:08(B)(1)–(B)(2), -439.12.11(B)(1)–(B)(2) (Cum.
Supp. 2021)).
26. §§ 58.1-439.12:08, -439.12:11 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
27. Acts of Apr. 15, 2021, chs. 553 & 554, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ & 2021 Va. Acts __, __
(codified as amended at §§ 58.1-433.1, -439.2, -2626.1 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
28. §§ 58.1-433.1, -439.2 (Cum. Supp. 2021).
29. Id. § 58.1-2626.1 (Cum. Supp. 2021).
30. Id. §§ 58.1-433.1(C), -439.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
31. Id. § 58.1-433.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
32. Id.
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resource management plan.33 Virginia has two main agricultural
best management practice programs, both of which are designed to
improve or maintain water quality in the state’s streams, lakes,
and bays. These two programs are the Agricultural Best Management Practices Cost-Share34 and the Agricultural Best Management Practices Tax Credit.35
Prior to the new legislation, the agricultural best management
tax credit was a refundable tax credit in an amount equal to 25%
of the first $70,000 expended for agricultural best management
practices to reduce nonpoint source pollutants by an individual
who has in place a soil conservation plan approved by the local Soil
and Water Conservation District (“SWCD”).36 The new legislation
amends this tax credit to increase it to 50% of the first $100,000
expended for agricultural best management practices.37
A similar enhanced credit under the new legislation is available
to a corporation engaged in agricultural production for market, or
that has equines that create needs for agricultural best management practices to reduce nonpoint source pollutants, and has in
place a resource management plan approved by the local SWCD is
now allowed a refundable credit in an amount equal to 50% of the
first $100,000 expended for agricultural best management practices implemented by a corporation on the acreage included in the
resource management plan.38
The new legislation has a sunset date of January 1, 2025, which
applies both to the existing Agricultural Best Management Practices Tax Credit and to the enhanced Agricultural Best Management Practices Tax Credit.39 The legislation also imposes an annual credit cap of two million dollars per fiscal year.40

33. Act of Mar. 11, 2021, ch. 40, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at § 58.1339.3 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
34. § 58.1-339.3 (Cum. Supp. 2021).
35. Id. § 58.1-439.5 (Cum. Supp. 2021).
36. Id. § 58.1-339.3 (Cum. Supp. 2021).
37. Id. § 58.1-339.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
38. Id. § 58.1-439.5(A) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
39. Id. §§ 58.1-339.3(A)(3), -439.5(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
40. Id. § 58.1-439.5(C)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
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d. Refundable Credit Enacted for Conservation Tillage and
Precision Agricultural Equipment
The General Assembly enacted Virginia Code sections 58.1-337
and 58.1-436, creating a new refundable individual and corporate
income tax credit for 25% of expenditures for the purchase of conservation tillage and precision agriculture equipment certified by
the Virginia Soil and Water Conservation Board as reducing soil
compaction or improving the precision of pesticide and fertilizer
application or injection.41 The legislation lists, as an example of
equipment that reduces soil compaction, a “no-till” planter, drill, or
other equipment, or equipment that provides more precise pesticide and fertilizer application or injection.42 The maximum amount
of the credit is $17,500 per taxable year.43 There is no annual cap
on the amount of credit available each taxable year.44 This new
credit is available for taxable years 2021 through 2025.45 The former agricultural equipment nonrefundable tax credit expires for
taxable years after taxable year 2020.46
5. Sales and Use Taxation
a. Temporary Sales and Use Tax Exemption Enacted for
Personal Protective Equipment
The Legislature enacted Virginia Code section 58.1-609.14 to
create an exemption from Virginia’s Retail Sales and Use Tax Act
for the purchase of personal protective equipment (“PPE”).47
The exemption is available to any business that has in place a
COVID-19 safety protocol that complies with the Emergency Temporary Standard promulgated by the Virginia Department of Labor and Industry and that meets the following criteria:
1. Reasonably prevent the spread of COVID-19;
2. Comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws;
3. Are consistent with best practices for infection prevention and
workplace hygiene;
41. Act of Mar. 18, 2021, ch. 272, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at §§ 58.1337, 58.1-436 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
42. §§ 58.1-337(A)(1), -436(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
43. Id. §§ 58.1-337(A)(3), -436(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
44. Id.
45. Id. §§ 58.1-337(A)(1), -436(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
46. Id. §§ 58.1-337(B)(1), -436(B)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
47. Acts of Mar. 11, 2021, chs. 55 & 56, __, __ & __, __ (codified as § 58.1-609.14 (Cum.
Supp. 2021)).
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4. Promote remote work to the fullest extent possible, including
increasing the number of telework-eligible employees; and
5. Implement enhanced cleaning, screening, testing, and contact
tracing procedures and any additional infection-control measures that
are reasonable in light of the work performed at the worksite and the
rate of infection in the surrounding community.48

For purposes of the exemption, “‘personal protective equipment’”
means only the following:
1. Disinfecting products approved for use against SARS-CoV-2 and
COVID-19;
2. Coveralls, full body suits, gowns, and vests;
3. Engineering controls such as substitution, isolation, ventilation,
and equipment modification to reduce exposure to SARS-CoV-2 and
COVID-19 disease-related workplace hazards and job tasks; engineering controls also include UVC sanitation equipment, indoor air quality
equipment such as ionization, HEPA filtration, and physical barriers;
4. Face coverings, face shields, and filtering facepiece respirators;
5. Gloves;
6. Hand sanitizer;
7. Hand-washing facilities;
8. HVAC, testing, and physical modifications to comply with the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/American Society of
Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE)
Standards 62.1 and 62.2 (ASHRAE 2019a, 2019b);
9. Medical and nonmedical masks;
10. Physical barriers and electronic sensors or systems designed to
maintain or monitor physical distancing of employees from other employees, other persons, and the general public, including acrylic
sneeze guards, permanent or temporary walls, electronic employee
monitors, and proximity sensors in employee badges;
11. Respiratory protection equipment;
12. Safety glasses;
13. Signs related to COVID-19;

48.

§ 58.1-609.14(A) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
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14. Temperature-checking devices and monitors, and
15. Testing and related equipment related to COVID-19.49

“No exemption [is] allowed . . . for a purchase by a qualifying
business for other than business use.”50
“Other than business use” means, with respect to the purchased item
or service, that . . . the business uses the purchased item or service
more than 50% of the time for nonbusiness purposes, or . . . the business transfers a purchased item to a person other than the business
or transfers the use of a purchased service to a person other than the
business.51

If the Department of Taxation receives information that a business has made a tax-exempt purchase for PPE and used the purchase for other than business use, the Tax Department must notify
the business, and the business would be required to remit the tax
due on the purchase, plus a penalty of 10% of the tax due and interest accruing from the date of purchase.52 The Tax Department
must also notify the business that its qualification for the exemption is revoked if it receives information that a business is not following its COVID-19 safety protocols.53 The PPE exemption expires on the first day following the expiration of the last executive
order issued by Virginia’s Governor related to the COVID-19 pandemic and the termination of the COVID-19 Emergency Temporary Standard and any permanent COVID-19 regulations adopted
by the Virginia Safety and Health Codes Board.54 The legislation
included an emergency clause making the temporary exemption
effective as of March 11, 2021.55
b. Sales and Use Tax Exemption for Data Centers Amended
The Virginia Legislature made a number of changes to the sales
and use tax exemption for data centers.56 The legislation reduces
the new job creation requirement for any data center located in a
distressed locality from twenty-five jobs to ten jobs in order to

49. Id.
50. Id. § 58.1-609.14(B) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
51. Id. § 58.1-609.14(A) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
52. Id. § 58.1-609.14(C)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
53. Id. § 58.1-609.14(C)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
54. Id. § 58.1-609.14(D)(4) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
55. Id. § 58.1-609.14(D)(5) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
56. Acts of Mar. 25, 2021, chs. 367, 368, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ & __, __ (codified as
amended at § 58.1-609.3(18)(a), (b), (c) (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
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qualify for the sales and use exemption for data centers.57 The
amended exemption also reduced the requirement of a $150 million
capital investment to $70 million for data centers that qualify for
the reduced jobs requirement.58
The legislation modifies the definition of “distressed locality” to
include:
1. From July 1, 2021, until July 1, 2023, any locality that had
(i) an annual unemployment rate for calendar year 2019 that
was greater than the final statewide average unemployment
rate for that calendar year and (ii) a poverty rate for calendar
year 2019 that exceeded the statewide average poverty rate
for that year;59 and
2. From and after July 1, 2023, any locality that has (i) an annual unemployment rate for the most recent calendar year
for which such data is available that is greater than the final
statewide average unemployment rate for that calendar year
and (ii) a poverty rate for the most recent calendar year for
which such data is available that exceeds the statewide average poverty rate for that year.60
The distressed locality must meet both of the criteria at the time
of the execution of the memorandum of understanding signed with
the Virginia Economic Development Partnership (“VEDP”).61 The
legislation also clarifies that the exemption includes any data center facilities located in the same locality as the data center that are
under common ownership or affiliation of the data center operator.62
c. Sales and Use Taxes and Transient Occupancy Taxes on
Accommodations to be on Total Charges Where the
Intermediary Facilitates Accommodations
Beginning September 1, 2021, the retail sales and use tax and
transient occupancy taxes on accommodations must be computed
upon the basis of the total charges or the total price paid for use or

57. § 58.1-609.3(18)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
58. Id.
59. Id. § 58.1-609.3(18)(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
60. Id. § 58.1-609.3(18)(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
61. Id. § 58.1-609.3(18)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
62. Id.

140

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:129

possession of the room.63 Where an accommodations provider contracts with an intermediary to facilitate the sale of accommodations and the intermediary charges the customer for the room and
also an accommodations fee, the intermediary is deemed the dealer
for the transaction and is required to separately state the taxes on
the bill or invoice and to collect the taxes on the entire amount paid
for the use or possession of the room.64
When the accommodations are at a hotel, the accommodations
intermediary must remit the taxes collected on the accommodations fee to the Department of Taxation or locality, as applicable,
and any remaining tax to the hotel, which the hotel would then be
required to remit to the Tax Department or locality, as applicable.65
If the accommodations are not a hotel, the accommodations intermediary must remit the sales tax collected on the entire amount of
the transaction to the Tax Department and the occupancy tax collected to the locality.66
The legislation defines an “accommodations intermediary” to include “any person other than an accommodations provider that facilitates the sales of an accommodation, charges a room charge to
the customer,” and retains such fee as compensation for facilitating
the sale.67 An accommodation intermediary does not include a person (1) where the intermediary owns the trademark or tradename
under which the accommodations provider is operating, or (2)
where the price paid by the customer to such person is equal to the
price paid by the facilitator to the accommodation received by the
facilitator is a commission to the facilitator from the accommodations provider.68

63. Act of Mar. 25, 2021, ch. 383, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at §§ 58.1602, -603, -612.2, -3818.8, -3819, -3819.1, -3823, -3824, -3825, -3825.2, -3825.3, -3826, -3842,
-3843) (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
64. § 58.1-612.2(A), (E) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
65. Id. § 58.1-612.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
66. Id.
67. Id. § 58.1-602 (Cum. Supp. 2021).
68. Id.
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B. Significant Attorney General Opinion—Authority of
Department of Taxation to Adopt a Pro-Rata Methodology for
Calculating the Amount of a Retirement Plan Distribution that
Represents a Taxpayer’s Contributions for Purposes of Virginia
Code Section 58.1-322.02(11) Subtraction
The Attorney General of Virginia was asked to render a formal
opinion to State Senator R. Creigh Deeds on the authority under
state law of the Department of Taxation to adopt a pro-rata methodology for calculating the amount of a retirement plan distribution that represents the taxpayer’s contributions to the retirement
plan for purposes of the subtraction from Virginia taxable income
as provided in Virginia Code section 58.1-322.02(11).69
If a taxpayer’s federal adjusted gross income includes certain retirement plan distributions, Virginia Code section 58.1-322.02(11)
authorizes a subtraction to compute Virginia taxable income for
the contributions to which were deductible from the taxpayer’s federal gross income, but only to the extent the contributions to the
retirement plan or program were subject to taxation under the income tax in another state.70 “Section 58.1-322.02(11) does not [provide] the specific methodology to be used to calculate which portion
of a plan distribution represents a taxpayer’s contribution to the
plan (which may be subtracted), and which portion represents income generated by those contributions (which may not be subtracted).”71
The Attorney General noted that the Tax Department adopted a
pro-rata approach to determine which portion of a retirement plan
distribution represents contributions to the plan, and which portions represent taxable earnings.72 The Tax Department’s approach follows the methodology prescribed by IRC section 72 to determine what portion of an annuity represents a taxpayer’s
nontaxable recovery of their investment in such annuity contract,
and what portion of the payment represents taxable income.73
Although section 58.1-322.02(11) does not specify the methodology to be used by the Tax Department, the Attorney General noted
that the State Tax Commissioner and the Department of Taxation
69. 19-058 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 1 (2020).
70. Id. at 1–2 (citing § 58.1-322.02(11) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
71. Id. at 2.
72. Id.
73. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 72).
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supervise administration of Virginia’s tax laws.74 The Virginia Attorney General held that absent a statutory directive requiring or
prohibiting the use of a specific methodology, the Department of
Taxation is vested with discretion to determine how to calculate
the subtraction authorized by section 58.1-322.02(11) of the Virginia Code.75 The Attorney General concluded that the Tax Department has the discretion under Virginia law to adopt a pro-rata
methodology to calculate the amount of a retirement plan distribution that may be subtracted from Virginia taxable income pursuant
to section 58.1-322.02(11).76
II. TAXES ADMINISTERED BY LOCALITIES
A. Significant Legislative Activity
1. State and Local Property Tax Exemption Enacted and
Revenue Shares for Energy Storage Systems
The General Assembly enacted legislation to provide that energy
storage systems are exempt from state and local property tax because they are not included in the definition of certified pollution
control equipment and facilities.77 For purposes of the exemption,
“energy storage system” is defined as equipment, facilities, or devices that are capable of absorbing energy, storing it for a period of
time, and redelivering that energy after it has been stored.78 The
exemption only applies to certain projects with alternating current
(“AC”) storage capacity of more than 5 megawatts and less than
150 megawatts.79 The exemption will not apply unless an application has been filed with the locality for the project before July 1,
2030, regardless of whether a locality assesses a revenue share on
such project.80 If the locality adopts an energy revenue share, the
exemption for energy storage systems greater than five megawatts
is 100% of the assessed value.81 If the locality does not adopt an
energy revenue share, the exemption for energy storage systems
74. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-202(1) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 3.
77. Acts of Mar. 11, 2021, chs. 49 & 50, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ & __, __ (codified as
amended at §§ 58.1-2600, -2628, -2636 & -3660) (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
78. § 58.1-3660(B) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
79. Id. § 58.1-3660(D), (G) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
80. Id.
81. Id. § 58.1-3660(H) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
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greater than five megawatts is as follows: 80% of the assessed
value in the first five years of service, 70% of the assessed value in
the second five years of service, and 60% of the assessed value in
the remaining years in service.82
Lastly, this legislation permits a locality to assess a revenue
share of up to $1400 per megawatt of AC storage capacity on energy storage systems and increase the revenue share by 10% on
solar and energy storage systems beginning on July 1, 2026, and
every five years thereafter for projects approved by the locality on
or after January 1, 2021.83
2. Sunset Date Extended for Certain Local Gas Severance Taxes
The General Assembly extended the sunset date from January
1, 2022, to January 1, 2024, for the local gas severance tax that is
dedicated to (a) the local Coal and Gas Road Improvement Fund;
(b) the Virginia Coalfield Economic Development Fund; and (c) water, sewer, and natural gas systems and lines.84 Prior to this legislation, the local gas severance tax may not be imposed on or after
January 1, 2022.85
B. Significant Advisory Opinion by the State Tax Commissioner
on PPP Loans and the BPOL Tax
The U.S. Congress enacted the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act on March 27, 2020.86 One of the components of the CARES Act is the creation of a loan program commonly known as the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) which
is administered by the federal Small Business Administration
(“SBA”). Under certain circumstances, borrowers of PPP loans may
apply for and qualify for full or partial loan forgiveness under the
CARES Act. A representative of a Virginia city asked the State Tax
Commissioner for an advisory opinion on whether the portion of
any PPP loan that is forgiven by the SBA should be included in a

82. Id. § 58.1-3660(G) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
83. Id. § 58.1-2636(A) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
84. Act of Mar. 30, 2021, ch. 430, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at § 58.13713 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
85. § 58.1-3713 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
86. CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (Mar. 27, 2020).
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taxpayer’s gross receipts for purposes of the business, professional,
and occupational license (“BPOL”) tax.87
The Tax Commissioner stated in this advisory opinion that loan
proceeds are not considered to be income for federal income tax
purposes because they have to be paid back. However, income from
the discharge of indebtedness is considered gross income for federal income tax purposes.88 The CARES Act created an exclusion
from gross income for loans forgiven under the PPP. The Tax Commissioner also stated that you must look at the applicable BPOL
statutes and regulations because the BPOL tax is a separate and
distinct tax from income tax.89
Virginia Code section 58.1-3732(A)(4) excludes receipts which
are the proceeds of a loan transaction in which the licensee is the
obligator.90 While this statute does not cover scenarios in which
some part of a loan may be forgiven, the Tax Commissioner advised
that a forgiven loan does not change the character of the funds as
proceeds of a loan transaction. Additionally, there is an exclusion
for loan proceeds that are not derived from the exercise of the licensed privilege to engage in a business or profession in the ordinary course of business.91
Accordingly, the State Tax Commissioner opined that loan proceeds paid out under the Paycheck Protection Program are not
gross receipts for purposes of the BPOL tax, regardless of whether
some part or all of such loans are forgivable or not.92
C. Significant Judicial Decisions
1. Supreme Court of Virginia Rules Transient Occupancy Tax
Applies to Home Rentals
For Virginia Transient Occupancy Tax (“TOT”) purposes, the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the Fairfax County Circuit Court
decision that dismissed a case brought by a group of homeowners
who use online platforms to make short-term rentals of their

87. VA. DEP’T OF TAX’N, PUB. DOC. 21-12 (2021), https://www.tax.virginia.gov/laws-rules
-decisions/rulings-tax-commissioner/21-12 [https://perma.cc/RD8C-5TKD].
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3732(A)(4) (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
92. Id.
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homes and challenged the county’s assessments of the TOT to their
rental income.93 In this proceeding, a group of taxpayers owned and
possessed homes in Fairfax County, and through various online
marketplace platforms the taxpayers rented out their individual
homes for short periods of time.94 In March 2018, the Board of Supervisors adopted a resolution that short-term lodging uses typically referred to as the rental or occupancy of a dwelling portion or
portion of a dwelling for transient occupancy of fewer than thirty
days.95 In addition to other changes, the Board of Supervisors made
amendments to its ordinances that imposed requirements on
short-term lodging providers to pay fees, obtain permits, keep
guest records, allow reasonable inspections and comply with building costs. The County also imposed a transient occupancy tax of 2%
on the cost of the short-term lodging.96
While a good portion of the case focused on zoning matters, the
taxpayers also argued the imposition of the TOT was not authorized by the Virginia Code.97 The trial court rejected the taxpayers’
argument that the board of supervisors did not have the authority
to impose the TOT.98 Specifically, the taxpayers’ argument attempted to differentiate between hotels, motels, and boarding
houses and their short-term renting. The taxpayers argued that
since their properties did not qualify as a hotel, motel, or boarding
house, the board was not authorized to impose the TOT tax on its
properties.99
The Supreme Court of Virginia looked at the Virginia Code section 58.1-3819(A), in particular that portion of the statute authorizing any county, by duly adopted ordinance, to levy a transient
occupancy tax on hotels, motels, boarding houses, travel
campgrounds, and other facilities offering guest rooms rented for
continuous occupancy for fewer than thirty consecutive days. The
Court notes that this language does not describe a type of property
(i.e., commercial vs. residential). Rather, it describes the manner
in which the property is used.100 The Court states it is undisputed

93.
(2021).
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Norton v. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax Cnty., __ Va. __, __, 858 S.E.2d 170, 171, 176
Id. at __, 858 S.E.2d at 172.
Id. at __, 858 S.E.2d at 172.
Id. at __, 858 S.E.2d at 172.
Id. at __, 858 S.E.2d at 172–73.
Id. at __, 858 S.E.2d at 173.
Id. at __, 858 S.E.2d at 174–75.
Id. at __, 858 S.E.2d at 176.
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that the taxpayers use their properties in the same manner as hotels, motels, etc., albeit to a lesser degree. The Court highlighted
the trial court’s express finding on this subject stating:
While the level of ancillary services provided such as maid service,
food service and other amenities varies greatly between these types of
accommodations, they all provide a place for people to stay where they
can live and sleep. The [taxpayers’] residences likewise are offered as
an accommodation to people requiring a place to conduct those same
activities of daily living, and thus the term “other facilities” is property construed to include them.101

The Court stated that while the properties are clearly distinguishable from hotels, motels, boarding houses and travel campgrounds in many respects, those distinctions are irrelevant in determining whether Virginia Code section 58.1-3819(A) allows a locality to levy a transient occupancy tax on those properties.102 The
Court concluded the trial court did not err in dismissing the taxpayers’ challenge to the TOT ordinance amendment, affirming the
judgment.103
2. ITFA Preempts Virginia’s Business, Professional, and
Occupational License Tax
The Norfolk City Circuit Court held that the Internet Tax Freedom Act (“ITFA”) proscribes the City of Norfolk’s BPOL tax as applied to the gross receipts associated with Cox Communications
Hampton Roads, L.L.C. (“Cox”) internet access services, unless the
BPOL tax falls within the ITFA’s grandfather clause or is otherwise grandfathered by the ITFA.104 The circuit court did not address in this opinion which party had the burden of proving
whether Norfolk’s BPOL tax has been grandfathered by the ITFA
as the court addressed the substantive tax issues on cross motions
for partial summary judgment.105
Cox has a Norfolk business license and provides a number of services, including internet access services, to its Norfolk customers.106 Norfolk imposed the BPOL gross receipts tax, and Cox paid

101. Id. at __, 858 S.E.2d at 176.
102. Id. at __, 858 S.E.2d at 176.
103. Id. at __, 858 S.E.2d at 176.
104. Cox Commc’ns Hampton Rds., L.L.C. v. Poston, 105 Va. Cir. 450, 450 (2020) (Norfolk County).
105. Id. at 450–51.
106. Id. at 451.
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the BPOL tax on its total gross receipts in 2013, 2014, and 2015.107
Cox subsequently filed a refund claim with the Norfolk Commissioner of the Revenue with respect to the receipts Cox received that
were applicable to its charges for internet access, a refund amount
that totaled $325,683.108 The Commissioner of the Revenue denied
the refund claim filed by Cox.109 When the 2016 BPOL tax year
arrived, Cox did not pay the BPOL tax associated with its internet
access fees, claiming again that the ITFA prohibits the BPOL tax
on its internet access services.110 The Commissioner of the Revenue
responded with an additional assessment for $128,374, plus penalties and interest.111
Cox administratively appealed the Commissioner of the Revenue’s two rulings to the State Tax Commissioner, who agreed with
Cox that the ITFA applies to, and therefore prohibits, the BPOL
tax on gross receipts from internet access services.112 The State Tax
Commissioner also concluded that the burden rests with Norfolk
to prove it qualified for exemption under the ITFA’s grandfather
provisions.113 The State Tax Commissioner was not able to reach a
resolution on the burden shifting caused by the ITFA, which he
found to be incompatible with Virginia’s administrative appeals
process for state and local taxes.114 As a result, the State Tax Commissioner did not issue a correction allowing Norfolk’s tax assessments to stand.115
Both Cox and Norfolk filed petitions with the Norfolk Circuit
Court which consolidated the cases into a single action.116
Both parties argued what weight, if any, the State Tax Commissioner’s determination should be given.117 Cox argued the State
Tax Commissioner’s ruling regarding application of the ITFA to
the BPOL tax should be given weight, but also acknowledged the
trial court is not bound by the State Tax Commissioner’s ruling.118

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 451.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 451–52.
Id. at 452.
Id. at 452.
Id. at 452.
Id. at 452.
Id. at 452, 455.
Id. at 455.
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The City argued the court should not give any weight or deference
to the ruling.119 The court noted that the State Tax Commissioner’s
interpretation of an ambiguous tax statute should receive great
weight. However, if the tax statute is not ambiguous, the trial court
concluded it shall afford no weight to the State Tax Commissioner’s
interpretation.120
On the substantive tax issues, Cox argued that the BPOL tax is
a “tax” as defined by the ITFA.121 The ITFA defines a tax as “any
charge imposed by any governmental entity for the purpose of generating revenues for governmental purposes and . . . not [for] a fee
imposed for a specific privilege, service, or benefit conferred.”122
The City conceded that the BPOL tax is a charge that Norfolk imposes to generate revenue for governmental purposes.123 Norfolk
argued that its BPOL tax is also a fee imposed for a specific privilege and, therefore, is more akin to classification as a fee under the
federal statute.124 A fee imposed on a business is a charge imposed
for a specific privilege, service, or benefit conferred.125 The trial
court concluded that the BPOL tax is a tax under the ITFA, and
not a fee.126 Following the analysis of the Supreme Court of Virginia in Dulles Duty Free, L.L.C. v. County of Loudoun,127 the court
concluded that the BPOL tax is based on a percentage of gross receipts, so it is a tax on the goods themselves and not a tax placed
on the privilege to engage in business activity.128 The BPOL tax, by
measuring business activity via gross receipts, acts as a tax directly on the services that generate those receipts. Cox is an internet access provider, and the City applied its BPOL Tax to the gross
receipts related to Cox’s provision of internet services.129
The circuit court, however, would not address the issue of which
party bears the burden of proof on the application of whether Norfolk is grandfathered under the ITFA, so it can still impose its

119. Id. at 455.
120. Id. (citing Nielsen Co. v. Cnty. Bd. of Arlington Cnty., 289 Va. 79, 88, 767 S.E.2d 1,
4–5 (2015)).
121. Id. at 456.
122. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 151 note § 1105(8)(A)(i) (Moratorium on Internet Taxes)).
123. Id. at 456.
124. Id. at 456–57.
125. Id. at 457.
126. Id. at 457.
127. Id. (citing Dulles Duty Free, L.L.C. v. Cnty. of Loudoun, 294 Va. 9, 11–12, 803
S.E.2d 54, 55 (2017)).
128. Id. at 461.
129. Id. at 463.
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BPOL tax on Cox. The circuit court granted Cox partial summary
judgment on the BPOL tax as an impermissible tax under ITFA,
but it left the issue of whether the BPOL tax is grandfathered for
another hearing.130
Following the circuit court’s opinion on the issue of whether the
BPOL tax is barred by the ITFA, the court was asked to address
Cox’s motion on the burden of proof at trial.131 The circuit court
ruled that Cox had the burden of proof to show that Norfolk’s
BPOL tax did not fall within the ITFA grandfather clause.132 The
circuit court stated that under Virginia Code section 58.1-3703.1,
Cox, as the party challenging the State Tax Commissioner’s ruling,
had the burden of proving that the determination was erroneous
which can be done by proving the original assessment was “otherwise invalid or illegal.”133 In reaching this result, the Norfolk Circuit Court looked at two other recent trial court decisions on this
or “the same” issue, both of which concluded that the applicability
of the ITFA’s grandfather provision to a BPOL tax rested with the
locality assessing the BPOL tax.134
The Norfolk Circuit Court wrestled with competing burdens of
proof. The circuit court noted that a Virginia locality seeking to
impose its BPOL tax on the gross receipts of a business has the
burden to prove it qualified for exemption under the ITFA’s grandfather provisions. However, under Virginia’s BPOL tax administrative appeals to a locality, the locality’s assessment was deemed
prima facie correct, and the taxpayer has the burden to prove it is
erroneous.135
The circuit court stated that under Virginia Code section 58.13703.1, Cox, as the party challenging the State Tax Commissioner’s determination, has the burden of proving that the determination was erroneous.136 The court elaborated that because the
Commissioner of the Revenue determined that the assessment
against Cox was valid and that the BPOL tax would be
130. Id. at 464.
131. Cox Commc’ns Hampton Rds., L.L.C. v. Poston, CL19-4764, 2021, Va. Cir. LEXIS
60, at *1 (Apr. 7, 2021) (Norfolk County).
132. Id. at *2.
133. Id. at *13–*14.
134. Id. at *19–*23 (citing Mugler v. Cellco P’ship, No. 18-1409, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 663,
at *12–*14 (July 13, 2020); Bd. of Supervisors v. Coxcom, L.L.C., 104 Va. Cir. 248, 252
(2020)). Craig D. Bell & Michael H. Brady, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Taxation, 55 U.
RICH. L. REV. 151, 168–71 (2020).
135. Id. at *25.
136. Id. at *14–*15 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703.1(A)(7)(a)) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
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grandfathered if the ITFA applied to the BPOL tax—and the State
Tax Commissioner affirmed that determination—proving that the
original assessment was “otherwise invalid” involves disproving
the Commissioner of the Revenue’s determination. The circuit
court concluded that this means Cox bears the burden of proving
that the BPOL tax was not grandfathered.137
3. Supreme Court of Virginia Holds Isle of Wight County’s 2017
Machinery & Tools Tax Assessment is Nonuniform, Invalid,
and Illegal
The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled, for Virginia property tax
purposes, the County of Isle of Wight Circuit Court erred in granting the County’s motion to strike International Paper Company’s
(“IP”) application for correction of a 2017 machinery and tools
(“M&T”) tax assessment that IP claimed was nonuniform because
the M&T tax plan created disparity tax rates among taxpayers.138
This case had its genesis from an earlier court case where IP sued
Isle of Wight County seeking relief from M&T tax assessments for
machinery and tools located at its Franklin Mill location in the
County for tax years 2012 through 2014. After holding a trial, the
circuit court entered a final order in IP’s favor which held that the
County’s methodology of taxing IP’s machinery and tools at their
original total capitalized cost, without allowance for depreciation,
was clearly erroneous. The resulting M&T tax assessments were
held to be far in excess of the machinery and tools’ fair market
value for the 2012, 2013, and 2014 tax years.139 The M&T tax refund ordered by the court for tax years 2012 through 2014 was approximately $2.4 million plus accrued interest at 10% from the

137. Id. at *31–*32. In another Virginia locality, Cox Communications Hampton Roads,
L.L.C. brought the same challenge to its City of Chesapeake BPOL tax assessments on its
gross receipts received on providing internet to its customers. See Cox Commc’ns, L.L.C. v.
King, 105 Va. Cir. 481, 481 (2020). The Chesapeake Circuit Court bifurcated the case into
two phases, of which this opinion addressed the phase that involved the issue of whether
the ITFA applies to the BPOL tax. This case involved similar arguments by Cox and the
City of Chesapeake on the cross motions for summary judgment. The Chesapeake Circuit
Court granted a partial summary judgment to Cox, ruling that the ITFA prevents the City
of Chesapeake from assessing its BPOL tax on Cox, unless its BPOL Tax is grandfathered
under the exemptions provided by the ITFA. The latter question was not before the circuit
court at this stage of the case.
138. Int’l Paper Co. v. Cnty. of Isle of Wight, 299 Va. 150, 847 S.E.2d 507 (2020); see
Final Order at 1, Int’l Paper Co. v. Cnty. of Isle of Wight, No. CL14001026-00 (Va. Cir. Ct.
Feb. 21, 2017) (County of Isle of Wight).
139. Int’l Paper Co., 299 Va. at 158, 847 S.E.2d at 512.
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dates IP made their first and second half M&T tax payments for
2012 through 2014 (the “First Refund Action”).140
During the pendency of the First Refund Action, the County’s
retained expert concluded that the County’s assessment of M&T
property at 100% of its originally capitalized cost resulted in valuations of M&T property in excess of fair market value. Isle of Wight
Commissioner of the Revenue Gerald Gwaltney, after public notice, changed the valuation methodology of M&T in the County
from 100% to 40% of original capitalized cost for M&T tax year
2016.141 Gwaltney recommended that the County’s Board of Supervisors adopt an amended M&T tax rate of $1.75 per $100 of assessed value for M&T tax year 2016, in order to make the change
to the 2016 M&T property valuations revenue neutral.142
The County’s Board of Supervisors passed an ordinance on October 20, 2016, increasing the M&T tax rate from $0.70 per $100
of assessed value to $1.75 per $100 of assessed value, for M&T tax
year 2016. The ordinance noted that the change was revenue neutral for the 2016 for the County and the M&T taxpayers.143 The
only real net effect was to make the 2016 M&T tax ordinance essentially unassailable should it be added by IP to the First Refund
Action then currently pending in circuit court.
In December 2016, Commissioner Gwaltney sent letters to M&T
taxpayers in the County, conceding that their M&T property valuations for tax years 2013 through 2015 had been above fair market
value. He also informed them that the valuations for those tax
years would be retroactively reduced and tax refunds voluntarily
issued because of the overpayments the County had received from
the M&T taxpayers as a result of the improper valuations.144 The
County issued refunds, based on a revised assessment of the M&T
property values at 60% of the original capitalized cost, rather than
the 100% of capitalized cost at which it was previously assessed
and taxed, for the 2013, 2014, and 2015 M&T tax years.145 The
County issued a total of $5.6 million in refunds.146
140. Id. at 158–59, 847 S.E.2d at 512.
141. Id. at 158–59, 847 S.E.2d at 512.
142. Id. at 159, 847 S.E.2d at 512.
143. Id. at 159, 847 S.E.2d at 512.
144. Id. at 159, 847 S.E.2d at 512. No refunds were made by the County for the 2012
M&T tax year because the statute of limitations expired for 2012, thereby precluding a refund for tax year 2012.
145. Id. at 159, 847 S.E.2d at 512.
146. Id. at 159, 847 S.E.2d at 512. The $5.6 million includes the circuit court ordered
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Along with their refund checks, M&T taxpayers also received a
letter from the County Administrator dated January 6, 2017, in
which the administrator stated:
The amount of the refunds was not anticipated in this year’s Operating Budget and will create a potential deficit that the board is now
taking steps to address. One of the anticipated steps is an increase in
the M&T tax rate for the County’s fiscal year 2017–18 budget. The
adjustment will only be for tax year 2017.
We have estimated that any tax increase over the current tax
amount will be very close to the amount of the refund you have just
received.147

At a County Board of Supervisors meeting on January 5, 2017,
Gwaltney briefed the Board on the approximately $5.6 million
M&T tax refunds he needed to issue.148 At that same meeting, Mr.
Gwaltney presented his plan to replenish the County’s budget.149
He recommended a one-year M&T tax rate increase from $1.75 per
$100 of assessed value to $4.24 per $100 of assessed value.150
Gwaltney also told the Board that this tax rate increase would also
be sufficient to permit some type of payment program for M&T taxpayers to offset any net increase in M&T tax assessments above
the amount of the M&T tax refund the M&T taxpayer had received.151
The Board subsequently approved the 2017 M&T tax rate increase on May 11, 2017, and on July 17, 2017, it approved a resolution appropriating the amount of $1,164,274 to fund Mr.
Gwaltney’s grant program, named Economic Development Retention Grants, from the 2017–2018 General Fund that would receive
the increased 2017 M&T tax collections.152 The Board funded the
Economic Development Retention Grants with $32,125 in appropriations and approximately $1.1 million which would be raised
from the increased 2017 M&T tax.153
As expressed by the Board, any business “negatively impacted
by the adjustment” received an M&T Tax Relief Program “grant,”
which prevented those negatively impacted from being burdened

refund to IP as a result of the First Refund Action.
147. Id. at 159–60, 847 S.E.2d at 512.
148. Id. at 159–60, 847 S.E.2d at 512–13.
149. Id. at 160, 847 S.E.2d at 513.
150. Id. at 160, 847 S.E.2d at 513.
151. Id. at 160, 847 S.E.2d at 513.
152. Id. at 161, 847 S.E.2d at 513.
153. Id. at 160, 847 S.E.2d at 513.
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by the tax increase.154 The payment by an M&T taxpayer, up to the
amount of the M&T tax refund the taxpayer received from the
County, was not considered by the County to negatively impact
that taxpayer.155
For tax year 2017, IP’s M&T property was assessed at a value of
$139,386,552.156 Application of the tax rate of $4.24 per $100 of assessed value and application of the M&T Tax Relief Program formula resulted in IP receiving an M&T tax bill from the County
which stated that it owed the County $5,485,481.82 in M&T taxes
for tax year 2017.157 IP timely paid the amount it was billed for its
2017 M&T taxes, and subsequently filed an application to correct
its assessment.158
On May 24, 2018, IP filed an application, pursuant to Code [section] 58.1-3984, for a correction of the County’s “nonuniform, invalid
& illegal” assessment of IP’s M&T taxes for tax year 2017 (the Second
Refund Action) in the Circuit Court of Isle of Wight County. The Second Refund Action had five counts, which asserted violations of: IP’s
vested right in the judgment it obtained in the First Refund Action
(Count 1), separation of powers (Count 2), the County’s statutory
grant of legislative authority (Count 3), tax uniformity required by Va.
Const. art. X, [section] 1 (Count 4), and the established classes of taxable property subject to uniformity pursuant to Va. Const. art. X, [section] 1 and Code [section] 58.1-3507(A) (Count 5). In its prayer for relief, International Paper requested that the circuit court find its 2017
M&T tax assessment to be ultra vires, erroneous, not uniform in its
application, invalid, and illegal, and that the 2017 M&T taxes paid by
International Paper be ordered refunded.
On November 19, 2018, International Paper filed a pretrial memorandum. International Paper argued that the County’s 2017 M&T tax
plan (the increased M&T tax rate and the M&T Tax Relief Program—
which International Paper referred to as a “Refund Clawback Ordinance”—violated International Paper’s vested right to its judgment in
the First Refund Action. It further contended that the County’s actions violated separation of powers because the County cannot indirectly nullify a court judgment. It also argued that the County’s 2017
M&T tax plan resulted in the County “clawing back the precise
amount” of tax refunds that International Paper received from the
County pursuant to the judgment in the First Refund Action for tax
years 2013–14 and the County’s administrative refund for tax year
2015. Finally, International Paper contended that the 2017 M&T tax

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 161, 847 S.E.2d at 513.
Id. at 162, 847 S.E.2d at 513.
Id. at 162, 847 S.E.2d at 513–14.
Id. at 162, 847 S.E.2d at 514.
Id. at 162, 847 S.E.2d at 514.

154

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:129

plan resulted in varying “effective rates” among M&T taxpayers,
which violated uniformity.
The County submitted a pretrial memorandum on the same date.
It argued that it had authority to tax M&T property and to raise the
M&T tax rate. [The County] also contended that the uniformity requirement does not apply to the outcome of a tax bill and that every
M&T taxpayer was subject to the same valuation method and tax rate.
It argued that M&T Tax Relief Program payments should not be considered in determining an “effective tax rate” because the grants from
such a program are not part of the tax process and not relevant to the
challenge of an “assessment” pursuant to Code [section] 58.1-3984.
Further, the County asserted that, even if the net amount owed for
M&T taxes after application of M&T Tax Relief Program payments is
within the meaning of “assessment,” the M&T Tax Relief Program
was uniformly applied.159

IP presented, over three days, thousands of pages of documents and hours of testimony to prove what it had pled. At the
conclusion of IP’s case in chief, the circuit court granted the
County’s motion to strike from the bench.160
Regarding vested rights, the circuit court explained that the 2017
M&T tax rate was a “new tax” and that “new taxes are required to be
paid” and do not violate a taxpayer’s vested rights to a prior judgment
regarding a different tax. Regarding separation of powers, the circuit
court noted that the Board is concerning the 2017 M&T tax plan and
thus, there was no violation of the separation of powers.
Regarding uniformity, the court held that an “effective tax rate” is
not relevant because any tax deduction can result in an “effective tax
rate” differential. [The court] therefore concluded that the 2017 M&T
tax rate and tax assessments were uniform notwithstanding the M&T
Tax Relief Program. The court also found that the “purpose and effect”
of the 2017 M&T tax plan was to cover the County’s budget deficit
created by the County’s tax refunds for prior tax years and to ensure
that no M&T taxpayers paid more than their entitled refund toward
closing that budget deficit. Accordingly, the circuit court dismissed the
Second Refund Action, with prejudice.161

On IP’s appeal, the supreme court concluded that IP had proven
its nonuniform case, citing at length both the admitted exhibits162
159. Id. at 162–63, 847 S.E.2d at 514 (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 168, 847 S.E.2d at 517.
161. Id. at 168, 847 S.E.2d at 517.
162. See, e.g., id. at 162–63, 847 S.E.2d at 514 (reviewing the “Second Refund Action”);
id. at 163–64, 847 S.E.2d at 514 (“[IP] offered into evidence documentation supporting the
facts as stated above” pertinent to the Second Refund Action); id. at 164, 847 S.E.2d at 514–
515 (“Additionally, [IP] offered two spreadsheets that showed the County’s assessed values
of M&T property, M&T Tax Relief Program payment amounts, and 2017 M&T tax bills for
all M&T taxpayers.”); Joint Appendix at 3405–5392, 299 Va. 150, 847 S.E.2d 507 (No.
190542).
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and testimony.163 Taken together, the supreme court held that this
evidence demonstrated “that the M&T Tax Relief Program operated effectively as a partial tax exemption that was part of the 2017
M&T taxation process, and that [IP]’s 2017 M&T tax assessment
was non-uniform, invalid, and illegal.”164 Put in terms of elements,
IP had shown, first, that “the M&T Tax Relief Program was effectively integrated into the M&T taxation process” and, second, that
this legislative “act produces a non-uniform effect among a constitutionally protected class of taxpayers.”165 Put in its procedural
context, the Court held that IP “provided prima facie evidence sufficient to show” these elements.166 Absent “contradictory evidence,”
“prima facie evidence” “will . . . sustain a judgment” for IP.167 The
evidence admitted at trial provided more than an adequate factual
basis for a rational factfinder to be persuaded that a nonuniform
assessment had been imposed.
D. M&T Tax Relief Program Shown to Be Part of M&T Taxation
Process
“Whether the Relief Program was effectively part of the 2017
M&T taxation process”—the first element of IP’s uniformity
claim—turns on the evidence of “the factual aspects of [that] legislative act, such as its intended purpose, its structure and administration, and its factual correlations to the tax it allegedly affects.”168 As the Court explained, these “particular factual aspects”
include “whether a grant or tax credit provided to a taxpayer is for
a stated purpose directly related to the tax, or whether it is structured and administered to directly reduce a specific tax obligation.”169 Others “include whether the legislative act was enacted at
substantially the same time as the tax act, whether the legislative

163. Int’l Paper, 299 Va. at 164–67, 847 S.E.2d at 515–16 (reviewing the testimony of
Messrs. Popovich, Gwaltney, Elder and Davis); Joint Appendix at 2818:20–2998:20, Int’l
Paper, 299 Va. 150, 847 S.E.2d 507 (No. 190542) (Mr. Popovich); Joint Appendix at 3011:3–
3139:22, Int’l Paper, 299 Va. 150, 847 S.E.2d 507 (No. 190542) (Mr. Gwaltney); Joint Appendix at 3142:19–3168:13, Int’l Paper, 299 Va. 150, 847 S.E.2d 507 (No. 190542) (Mr. Elder); Joint Appendix at 3218:4–3339:7, Int’l Paper, 299 Va. 150, 847 S.E.2d 507 (No. 190542)
(Mr. Davis).
164. Int’l Paper, 299 Va. at 190, 847 S.E.2d at 529.
165. Id. at 186, 847 S.E.2d at 527.
166. Id. at 187, 847 S.E.2d at 527.
167. Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 701 (11th ed. 2019) (defining “prima facie evidence”).
168. Int’l Paper, 299 Va. at 186, 847 S.E.2d at 527.
169. Id. at 185, 847 S.E.2d at 526.
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relief act lasts for the same duration as the tax, or whether the
legislation’s funding is linked to the tax.”170
The Supreme Court of Virginia catalogued an array of facts from
the trial establishing the first element, that M&T Tax “Relief Program was effectively part of the 2017 M&T taxation process.”171
These were that (1) the “stated purpose of the M&T Tax Relief Program was to relieve liability from the 2017 M&T tax rate increase,”
and was “tethered exclusively to 2017 M&T tax assessments”;172
(2) the “County structured and administered the M&T Tax Relief
Program to directly exempt M&T tax liability”;173 (3) “the payments from the M&T Tax Relief Program directly offset M&T tax
liability”;174 (4) “the M&T Tax Relief Program factually correlated
with the 2017 M&T tax rate increase to $4.24 per $100 of assessed
value,” being “enacted at substantially the same time” and applied
“for the same time period—the 2017 tax year”;175 and (5) “the M&T
Tax Relief Program was funded predominantly by the 2017 M&T
tax rate increase.”176
The Court found “[m]ost telling” that “the Relief Program computationally correlated with the M&T taxation process”—i.e.,
“[t]he payments from the M&T Tax Relief Program were calculated
exclusively with M&T taxation figures.”177 The Court noted that
Mr. Mark Popovich, then-County Attorney and designated corporate representative of Isle of Wight, testified via video deposition
to this fact and to the calculation process.178

170. Id. at 186, 847 S.E.2d at 526.
171. Id. at 186, 190, 847 S.E.2d at 527, 529.
172. Id. at 187, 847 S.E.2d at 527; see, e.g., Joint Appendix at 4534–35, 4673, 4680, 4915–
16, 5192–99, 5200, Int’l Paper, 299 Va. 150, 847 S.E.2d 507 (No. 190542).
173. Int’l Paper, 299 Va. at 187, 847 S.E.2d at 527; see, e.g., Joint Appendix at 3405–08,
3414–16, 4915, 5367–69, Int’l Paper, 299 Va. 150, 847 S.E.2d 507 (No. 190542).
174. Int’l Paper, 299 Va. at 188, 847 S.E.2d at 528; see, e.g., Joint Appendix at 4673–75,
5201, Int’l Paper, 299 Va. 150, 847 S.E.2d 507 (No. 190542).
175. Int’l Paper, 299 Va. at 188, 847 S.E.2d at 528; see, e.g., Joint Appendix at 4342–43,
4680, 4915–16, 5200, 5370–71, 5367–69, Int’l Paper, 299 Va. 150, 847 S.E.2d 507 (No.
190542).
176. Int’l Paper, 299 Va. at 188, 847 S.E.2d at 528; see, e.g., Joint Appendix at 4680,
4870–71, 4915–16, 5200, 5201, 5321, 5327–29, Int’l Paper, 299 Va. 150, 847 S.E.2d 507 (No.
190542).
177. Int’l Paper, 299 Va. at 188–89; see, e.g., Joint Appendix at 3405–08, 3414–16, 5201,
5158, Int’l Paper, 299 Va. 150, 847 S.E.2d 507 (No. 190542).
178. Int’l Paper, 299 Va. at 164–165, 847 S.E.2d at 515; see Joint Appendix at 2841:23–
2858:1, 2869:15–2870:18, 2873:23–2874:23, 2875:3–2883:11, 2886:8–2890:25, 2892:1–
2893:1, 2911:19–2931:11, 2947:2–2961:16, 2971:9–2973:21, 2976:5–2990:22, 4917–20
(plaintiff’s exhibit 43), 4923–65 (plaintiff’s exhibit 46), 4966–69 (plaintiff’s exhibit 47), 5158–
60, 5192–99 (plaintiff’s exhibit 50), 5319–5326 (plaintiff’s exhibit 53), 5327–29 (plaintiff’s

2021]

TAXATION

157

Summing up, the Court held that IP had “produced evidence”
“that the County intended, structured, funded, administered, and
calculated the M&T Tax Relief Program payments almost entirely
within the closed circuit of the M&T taxation process, and that the
M&T tax rate increase and the M&T Tax Relief program were both
part of an interwoven 2017 M&T tax strategy.”179 In short, “the
M&T Tax Relief Program was part of the 2017 M&T taxation process.”180
E. M&T Tax Relief Program Shown to Result in Non-Uniform
M&T Assessments
Virginia’s constitutional requirement of uniform property taxation is categorical and unequivocal. “Any act that ‘has the effect’ of
allowing one taxpayer to pay ‘less than another [taxpayer] similarly situated might be required to pay’ offends uniformity, no matter how the different treatment is effected.”181 As the Supreme
Court of Virginia explained at great length, “[i]n determining
whether application of a tax plan resulted in a non-uniform assessment,” courts “must consider the effect of the tax plan upon those
subject to it, rather than the government’s stated label for its actions.”182 Bringing these principles to bear on this case, the Court
on appeal reviewed the evidence to determine whether “the 2017
M&T tax plan resulted in 2017 M&T tax assessments that were
not uniform.”183 Under the evidence already adduced, it was
equally clear that the “2017 M&T tax assessments,” including IP’s
assessment for $5,909,989.80, “were not uniform.”184
The Court held that IP’s case-in-chief constituted “prima facie
evidence sufficient to show that the M&T Tax Relief Program payments . . . had the same effect as partial tax exemptions.”185 To
reach this conclusion, the Court reviewed the detailed testimony
exhibit 54), Int’l Paper, 299 Va. 150, 847 S.E.2d 507 (No. 190542).
179. Int’l Paper, 847 S.E.2d at 528, 299 Va. at 189; id. at 187, 847 S.E.2d at 527 (explaining that this amounted to “prima facie evidence sufficient to show that the M&T Tax Relief
Program payments were integrated into the M&T taxation process . . . .”); see id. at 189, 847
S.E.2d at 528 (“Thus, [IP] provided sufficient evidence to prove that the M&T Tax Relief
Program was part of the 2017 M&T taxation process.”).
180. Id. at 189, 847 S.E.2d at 528.
181. Int’l Paper, 299 Va. at 182 (quoting Indus. Dev. Auth. of Chesapeake v. Suthers,
208 Va. 51, 61–62, 155 S.E.2d 326 (1967)).
182. Id. at 186, 847 S.E.2d at 527.
183. Id. at 186, 847 S.E.2d at 527.
184. Id. at 186–87, 847 S.E.2d at 527.
185. Id. at 187, 847 S.E.2d at 527.
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from Mark Popovich, former County attorney and designated corporate representative of Isle of Wight, as to how the County “determine[d] the amount each [M&T taxpayer] owed the County for
2017 M&T taxes.”186 The Court explained:
the relief formula treated the M&T taxpayers differently based upon
whether the County had lawfully owed that taxpayer a refund on
M&T taxes overpaid in prior years. This created a sub-class of M&T
taxpayers. . . . Only those M&T taxpayers who had received a refund
owed to them by the County were required to pay the 2017 M&T tax
increase” to $4.24 per $100 of assessed value.187

F. The Supreme Court of Virginia Affirmed the Effects Analysis
for IP’s Uniformity Claim and Determined the Two Component
Pieces Were Part of an Interwoven Strategy
“Any act that ‘has the effect’ of allowing one taxpayer to pay ‘less
than another [taxpayer] similarly situated might be required to
pay’ offends uniformity, no matter how the different treatment is
effected.”188 “In summary, uniformity requires equality in every respect of the taxation process.”189 “Uniformity is thus the promise of
equality of treatment among members of a tax class during the
taxation process,” a fact on which IP has offered prima facie evidence.190
More specifically, the supreme court held that IP “provided
prima facie evidence sufficient to show that (1) the M&T Tax Relief
Program payments were integrated into the M&T taxation process
and that (2) the M&T Tax Relief Program payments had the same
effect as partial tax exemptions.”191 The Court stated the following
uncontroverted acts as support for its findings.
1. The stated purpose of the M&T Tax Relief Program was to
relieve liability from the 2017 M&T tax rate increase.192
2. The Board of Supervisor’s resolution implementing the M&T
Tax Relief Program specifically noted that the payments were for
186. Id. at 164–66, 847 S.E.2d at 516–17.
187. Id. at 189–90, 847 S.E.2d at 528–29; see id. at 161–62, 847 S.E.2d at 513 (“This
resulted in only the taxpayers who received refunds having to pay the substantially increased M&T tax rate, with the increased amount owed by them being limited to the amount
of the M&T tax refund they had received from the county.”).
188. 299 Va. at 182, 847 S.E.2d at 524.
189. Id. at 186, 847 S.E.2d at 526.
190. Id. at 178, 847 S.E.2d at 522.
191. Id. at 187, 847, S.E.2d at 527.
192. Id. at 187, 847 S.E.2d at 527.
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businesses negatively impacted by the adjustment to the M&T tax.
The phrase “the adjustment of the M&T tax” refers to the 2017
M&T tax increase to a rate of $4.24 per $100 of assessed value. The
stated goal of the M&T Tax Relief Program was therefore tethered
exclusively to 2017 M&T tax assessments.193
3. Although (the County’s corporate representative and County
Attorney) Popovich and Commissioner Gwaltney testified that the
M&T Relief Program was intended to keep M&T businesses from
leaving the County, the M&T Tax Relief Program’s incentive for
keeping these businesses was to effectively discharge some members of the M&T taxpayer class from M&T tax liability.194
4. The M&T Tax Relief Program had a purpose, at least in part,
to relieve liability from the 2017 M&T tax for a sub-class of M&T
taxpayers, deemed by the County to be “harmed” by the M&T tax
rate increase.195
5. The County structured and administered the M&T Tax Relief Program to directly exempt M&T tax liability. Elder testified
that the County’s economic development office was not involved in
the creation or implementation of the M&T Tax Relief Program,
despite that office having the same stated purpose expressed regarding the M&T Tax Relief Program—to promote and retain businesses in the County.196
6. The payments from the M&T Tax Relief Program directly
offset M&T tax liability. The County automatically subtracted the
relief payment amounts from each taxpayer’s 2017 M&T tax bill,
without any taxpayer applying for such payment. The payments
also did not apply to any taxpayer outside the class of taxpayers
who owned M&T tax property.197
7. The M&T Tax Relief Program factually correlated with the
2017 M&T tax rate increase to $4.24 per $100 of assessed value.
Both the 2017 M&T tax rate and the M&T Tax Relief Program
were enacted at substantially the same time: in May and June
2017, respectively. They both applied for the same time period: the
2017 tax year. As Popovich testified, the M&T Tax Relief Program

193. Id. at 187, 847 S.E.2d at 527.
194. Id. at 187, 847 S.E.2d at 527.
195. Id. at 187, 847 S.E.2d at 527.
196. Id. at 188, 847 S.E.2d at 528.
197. Id. at 188, 847 S.E.2d at 527.
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was a one-time, “unique” legislative act contemplated to coincide
with the 2017 M&T tax rate increase.198
8. The M&T Tax Relief Program was funded predominantly by
the 2017 M&T tax rate increase. The Board authorized $32,125 in
spending for the M&T Tax Relief Program, but it distributed
nearly $1.2 million in relief payments. That additional revenue
came from the anticipated 2017 M&T tax revenue produced by the
increased tax rate, which was forgiven by way of the relief payments. Although the revenue from that tax was assigned to the
general fund, the Board explicitly noted, in its July 2017 resolution, that $1,164,274 raised by the 2017 M&T tax would be dedicated to the M&T Tax Relief Program.199
9. The Relief Program computationally correlated with the
M&T taxation process. The County determined the amount of the
M&T Tax Relief Program payments by subtracting each taxpayer’s
hypothetical 2016 M&T tax calculation from the initial 2017 M&T
tax calculation, which produced the next tax increase. The County
then subtracted the M&T tax refund amount each taxpayer received for tax years 2013 through 2015 from the next tax increase
to determine the amount of the M&T Tax Relief Program payment
the taxpayer would have received as a credit. If the resulting
amount was a negative number for a taxpayer, the County did not
award any relief to that taxpayer. The County thus awarded relief
payments only to M&T taxpayers who experienced a net tax increase that was greater than the amount of the tax refund they had
received for tax years 2013 through 2015, exempting the sub-class
of M&T taxpayers from the burden of the 2017 M&T tax rate increase.200
10. The payments from the M&T Tax Relief Program were calculated exclusively with M&T taxation figures. The County calculated the payments based on (1) the value of each taxpayer’s M&T
property in tax year 2017, (2) the tax rates for tax years 2016 and
2017, and (3) the amount the taxpayer received as a tax refund,
which was based on the change in valuation of M&T property and
tax rates in past years. Thus, the M&T Tax Relief Program formula
only used factors that related to an aspect of the M&T taxation

198. Id. at 188, 847 S.E.2d at 527.
199. Id. at 188, 847 S.E.2d at 528.
200. Id. at 188–89, 847 S.E.2d at 528.
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process in determining the amount of tax relief a taxpayer was entitled to receive.201
11. In short, IP produced evidence to support its contention that
the County intended, structured, funded, administered, and calculated the M&T Tax Relief Program payments almost entirely
within the closed circuit of the M&T taxation process, and that the
M&T tax rate increase and the M&T Tax Relief Program were both
part of an interwoven 2017 M&T tax strategy. Thus, IP provided
sufficient evidence to prove that the M&T Tax Relief Program was
part of the 2017 M&T taxation process.202
12. By design, the relief formula treated the M&T taxpayers differently based upon whether the County had lawfully owed that
taxpayer a refund on M&T taxes overpaid in prior years. This created a sub-class of M&T taxpayers. The amount of refund a taxpayer had been owed by the County and the amount of the relief
payment the taxpayer received under the Relief Program were negatively correlated: the larger the refund an M&T taxpayer received, the smaller the relief payment. Only those M&T taxpayers
who had received a refund owed to them by the County were required to pay the 2017 M&T tax increase.203
13. IP also produced evidence that the “effective tax rates,” the
net tax rate paid by M&T taxpayers given the payments made to
some M&T taxpayers by the Relief Program, considering payments
granted to some taxpayers by the M&T tax plan, were not uniform.
Although the varying “effective tax rates” among M&T taxpayers
are not the cause of the nonuniformity, they were provided as indicia of the nonuniformity in the assessments levied under the
2017 M&T tax plan. Guy Davis (IP’s expert) opined at trial that, in
tax year 2017, thirty-nine M&T taxpayer accounts paid according
to the $4.24 rate, twenty-eight accounts paid according to a $1.75
rate, and thirty-three accounts paid somewhere in between those
two rates. IP was assessed at an effective rate of $3.94 per $100 of
assessed value. The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with IP that
these varying effective tax rates further exemplify the non-uniform
assessments produced by the 2017 M&T tax plan and support IP’s
claim.204

201. Id. at 189, 847 S.E.2d at 528.
202. Id. at 189, 847 S.E.2d at 528.
203. Id. at 189, 847 S.E.2d at 529.
204. Id. at 190, 847 S.E.2d at 529.
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Put simply, this unequal distribution of burdens on M&T was
the direct result of Isle of Wight giving “relief payments only to
M&T taxpayers who experienced a net tax increase [in 2017] that
was greater than the amount of the tax refund they had received
for tax years 2013 through 2015.”205 By awarding such “relief payments,” Isle of Wight was effectively “exempting that sub-class of
M&T taxpayers from the burden of the 2017 M&T tax rate increase.”206
The Court, thus, reversed the trial court’s order striking Counts
4 and 5 and held that IP had “provided prima facie evidence sufficient to show that the M&T Tax Relief Program operated effectively as a partial tax exemption that was part of the 2017 M&T
taxation process.”207 Importantly, the Court’s holding made explicit
the conclusion that implicitly follows: “that International Paper’s
2017 M&T tax assessment was non-uniform, invalid, and illegal.”208
The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the circuit court’s striking of the first three counts of its application to correct an erroneous 2017 M&T tax assessment.209 In Counts 1 through 3 of its complaint, IP claimed that the 2017 M&T tax plan adopted by the
County was “‘invalid or illegal’ because it violated IP’s vested
rights, the separation of powers doctrine, and was executed without statutory authority.”210 IP argued that the circuit court erred
in striking Counts 1, 2, and 3 because “its evidence established that
the County’s 2017 M&T tax plan’ had the operation, effect, and so
purpose, of clawing back legally required refunds, impairing vested
rights, breaching the separation of powers, and exceeding the statutory power to tax M&T.’”211
The supreme court stated that “[a]lthough the 2017 M&T tax
plan may have ‘clawed back’ the money the County paid [IP] pursuant to the First Refund Action, the tax increase and relief program did not interfere with [IP’s] vested rights to its judgment.”212
It “ha[d] been paid the money it had a vested right to receive.”213

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 189, 847 S.E.2d at 528.
Id. at 189, 847 S.E.2d at 528.
Id. at 190, 847 S.E.2d at 529.
Id. at 190, 847 S.E.2d at 529.
Id. at 847, 507 S.E.2d at 529.
Id. at 170, 847 S.E.2d at 518.
Id. at 170, 847 S.E.2d at 518.
Id. at 171, 847 S.E.2d at 519.
Id. at 171, 847 S.E.2d at 519.
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The Court held the trial court did not err in sustaining the motion
to strike as to Count 1.214
As to Count 2 claiming a violation of the separations of power,
the Court stated “the 2017 M&T tax rate increase did not invade
the judicial branch’s authority because the rate increase did not
void the First Refund Action final order, nor change the M&T tax
rates applicable in tax years 2012 through 2014, which were the
bases for the First Refund Action judgment.”215 “In short,” the
Court stated that “the County was not acting judicially, but was
executing its legislative authority when it increased the M&T tax
rate for the 2017 M&T tax year.”216 The Court concluded that trial
court did not err in striking Count 2 of the complaint.217
Count 3 claimed the County’s 2017 M&T tax plan was ultra vires
because it indirectly and retroactively revised IP’s M&T valuations
and tax rates for 2013–2015.218 The Court disagreed with IP’s
claim.219 The Court held that “[t]the circuit court did not err in concluding that under [Virginia] Code section 58.1-3507(A) and Article
X, section 4 of the Constitution of Virginia, the County had the
statutory and constitutional authority to impose taxes on M&T
property and that the County also had [] authority to execute the
M&T Tax Relief Program, pursuant to [Virginia] Code sections
15.2-940 and 15.2-950.”220
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the circuit court’s striking of IP’s Counts 4 and 5, and affirmed its striking Counts 1, 2,
and 3.221 Having reversed the final judgment, the Court “remand[d] the case to the Isle of Wight County circuit court for further trial proceedings in accordance with [it’s] opinion.”222
G. Remand Proceeding
The Remand trial was held on June 24, 2021, at Isle of Wight
Circuit Court. Upon the conclusion of taking evidence on the
County’s case in chief, the court heard a full half day of closing
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 171, 847 S.E.2d at 519.
Id. at 173, 847 S.E.2d at 520.
Id. at 173, 847 S.E.2d at 520.
Id. at 173, 847 S.E.2d at 520.
Id. at 173, 847 S.E.2d at 520.
Id. at 174–75, 847 S.E.2d at 520–21.
Id. at 174–75, 847 S.E.2d at 520–21.
Id. at 190, 847 S.E.2d at 529.
Id. at 190, 847 S.E.2d at 529.
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arguments. At the conclusion of arguments, the circuit court held
that, under the preponderance of evidence standard, IP established
that the 2017 M&T Tax Rate and the Economic Development Retention Grants were part of an interwoven tax plan and that the
2017 M&T tax assessments were not uniform as the M&T Tax Relief Program payments had the same effect as partial tax exemptions. The result, the court held, is a nonuniform, invalid, and illegal tax assessment levied on IP.223 Under the provisions of Virginia
Code section 58.1-3987, the circuit court ordered the County to refund $5,485,481.81 the full amount of IP’s 2017 M&T taxes paid to
the County together with accrued interest at an annual rate of 10%
according to the County’s ordinance.224
CONCLUSION
The 2021 session of the General Assembly produced fewer bills
enacted involving state and local taxation. However, several items
of legislation will have a large impact on Virginia’s judicial dispute
process on Virginia taxation. Appellate jurisdiction in Virginia is
split between the Supreme Court of Virginia and the Court of Appeals of Virginia. Currently, the court of appeals has jurisdiction
over criminal matters and only very limited civil cases. On January
1, 2022, that will change. The court of appeals will become the intermediate appellate court for all criminal and civil cases, including all tax cases. Importantly, these cases will become appeals of
right. This is a huge change for civil litigation in state courts. Currently, parties who are dissatisfied with a circuit court decision can
petition the Supreme Court of Virginia for the right to appeal, but
allowing an appeal is a matter of the court’s discretion, and most
tax cases are denied. Once the new law is in force, all civil and
criminal tax litigants of the circuit courts will be entitled to an appeal before the court of appeals. If a party is not satisfied with the
decision of the court of appeals, it will then have the right to petition the supreme court for the right to appeal further.
Additionally, House Joint Resolution 563 asked to study the possibility of moving Virginia’s corporate income tax reporting from a
separate return to a unitary combined reporting. The result of the
study may suggest change is in the air given the trend in many

223. Id. at 190, 847 S.E.2d at 529.
224. Final Order at 2, Int’l Paper v. Cnty. of Isle of Wight, No. 190542 (Va. Cir. Aug. 4,
2021).
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other states to adopt a unitary combined reporting system for corporate income tax purposes.
On the litigation front, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in a comprehensive decision, issued an opinion on Virginia’s constitutional
requirement of uniformity among taxpayers within the same class
of real or tangible personal property ad velorem taxation. International Paper Company v. County of Isle of Wight is easily the most
important decision on Virginia’s constitutional uniformity requirement in the last one hundred years. As a matter of all Virginia tax
jurisprudence, the Court’s decision is probably one of the most important opinions issued in the past several decades. Local tax cases
continue to represent the most active area of litigated tax disputes.
I believe this trend will continue.

